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CVE-2026-123158: OpenSSH password authentication bypass on musl-based Linux systems

By November 17, 202611 min read
CVE AnalysisCVE-2026-123158Cybersecurity
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OpenSSH on musl-based Linux with PAM disabled allows passwordless login with a 257–1024 character password. Fixed in 10.6p2; patch or disable password auth now.

CoeLab Real-World Impact: 85/100 — Urgent. Editorial score v1.0. Evidence checked 2026-11-17T10:10:31.728268+00:00. CVSS and EPSS are separate measures, not this editorial score.

Rating breakdown: exploitation: 30, reachability: 20, consequences: 20, operational relevance: 15.

Who is affected

CVE-2026-123158 affects Portable OpenSSH builds of sshd on Linux where the musl libc is used and PAM support is disabled — the configuration the upstream project describes as lacking a workaround for the bug, which the OpenSSH team considers to originate outside sshd itself but exploitable through it. OpenSSH portable releases before 10.6p2 are listed as affected in the CVE record, with the fix arriving in 10.6p2 released on 2026-11-05.

In practice, the clearest affected population is Alpine Linux. Alpine's openssh-server package has historically been built without PAM, and the Alpine security advisory of 2026-11-05 confirms the attack works there. Per Alpine, you are affected when all of the following hold: the server runs the Alpine openssh-server package without PAM (or openssh-server-pam with UsePAM no — UsePAM yes is not affected), PasswordAuthentication is enabled (the OpenSSH default unless it was explicitly changed), at least one account on the machine has * as its shadow password field, and at least one local account has a SHA-256 ($5$) or SHA-512 ($6$) crypt-style password hash present in /etc/shadow.

The * password field is common rather than exotic: Alpine's base image has shipped root:* since roughly Alpine 3.16, key-only accounts created without a password get '*', users arriving through musl-nscd directory services (nslcd, winbind, sssd) have no shadow entry at all, and the official Alpine tiny-cloud images ship an alpine user with '*' plus passwordless doas. Alpine verified the bug across releases 3.16 through 3.24 and edge, including releases that no longer receive regular updates.

Conversely, Alpine lists as not affected: containers that do not run sshd, systems with PasswordAuthentication no, systems using openssh-server-pam with UsePAM yes, locked accounts (password field '!'), systems where no account has a $-style password hash, and cloud images configured by cloud-init, which sets PasswordAuthentication no by default.

Real-world impact and exploitation evidence

This is a full authentication bypass. According to the Alpine advisory, an attacker who can reach the SSH port logs in without knowing any password, with a single connection that works every time and requires no retries. For the vulnerable configurations this removes the primary barrier sshd exists to provide — proving the client possesses a credential.

The exploitation picture is unusually well evidenced for a recent CVE. CISA added the vulnerability to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-11-09 — four days after the fix release — with a remediation due date of 2026-11-12 under BOD 26-04 and forensic triage marked yes. KEV listing is not the same as confirmed mass exploitation, but it reflects CISA's assessment of real-world risk and binds US federal agencies. The FIRST EPSS score sits at 0.189 as of 2026-11-16, placing it around the 97th percentile — a substantial attack-probability estimate for a week-old CVE. Public reproduction work exists: the CVE record references community reproductions, and the OpenSSH team noted the bug was reported by Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield, among reports accelerated by AI-assisted vulnerability discovery. Known ransomware campaign use is listed as Unknown.

One structural amplifier deserves emphasis: Alpine's tiny-cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3 ship the alpine user with a '*' password field and passwordless doas. They are safe on first boot but become exploitable as soon as any $6$ hash exists on the machine — for example when an administrator sets a console password or user-data creates a user with hashed_passwd. At that point an attacker gets a shell as alpine and can escalate directly to root via doas. This is the difference between an account takeover and a de facto full root compromise on those images.

Attack scope is bounded by PermitRootLogin. OpenSSH's default prohibit-password setting keeps root out of reach directly, but Alpine notes this does not help if another login-capable account can become root, for instance through doas.

Attack prerequisites

The attack is unauthenticated and network-reachable, but it is not universal. A candidate attacker needs: network reachability to the SSH service; a target system running a vulnerable sshd built against musl without PAM (Alpine being the canonical case); password authentication enabled in sshd; knowledge of at least one account name whose password field is '*' or which has no shadow entry; and at least one other account on the machine carrying a $5$ or $6$ password hash. Alpine emphasizes that one user with a password is enough — it makes every passwordless account reachable.

The mechanism, per the CVE description, relates to misinterpretation of whether a string is intended to be a password hash: the attacker sends a password between 256 and 1024 characters (Alpine states 257–1024 bytes) and the failure mode causes any such input to be accepted for the targeted passwordless account. The published CVSS vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (base 8.1, High) scores complexity as High, reflecting how many environmental conditions must line up — but when they do line up, as Alpine states, the attempt succeeds deterministically on the first try.

Actions and fixes

Two independent, complete fixes exist. The first is updating to OpenSSH 10.6p2 or a fixed distribution package — on Alpine, run apk upgrade -U -a. Alpine's fixed package versions are: edge 10.6_p2-r0; 3.24 10.3_p1-r2 (3.24.4); 3.23 10.2_p1-r1 (3.23.8); 3.22 10.0_p1-r11 (3.22.8); 3.21 9.9_p2-r1 (3.21.10); and backports to unsupported branches including 3.20 9.7_p1-r6, 3.19 9.6_p1-r3, 3.18 9.3_p2-r4, 3.17 9.1_p1-r7 and 3.16 9.0_p1-r6. Critically, upgrading the package does not replace the running daemon: after upgrading, restart sshd (rc-service sshd restart). Official tiny-cloud images built from 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4 or later include the fixed package; earlier-instanced machines must be updated in place.

The second fix — and the practical mitigation if you cannot update — is disabling password authentication: set PasswordAuthentication no in sshd configuration and restart sshd. Alpine documents a concrete drop-in plus sed procedure and stresses verifying with sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthentication afterwards. Do this only after confirming key-based login works, and keep your existing session open until you have tested a fresh login, or you risk locking yourself out.

Either one closes the hole. Operators running OpenSSH on glibc-based distributions with PAM enabled are not affected by this particular issue and need no emergency action beyond routine patching, but inventorying for musl-based sshd — container appliance images, minimal VMs, embedded devices — is where the surprise exposure usually hides.

For incident response, the KEV entry carries forensic-triage requirements for federal agencies, and any organization that matches the prerequisites should consider whether SSH logs from before the patch show anomalous long-password authentication attempts against passwordless accounts.

Uncertainty and what could change

Affected-population boundaries depend on third-party detail. The CVE record describes the condition generically (musl libc, without PAM, before 10.6p2); the fine-grained prerequisites — '*' shadow fields, $5$/$6$ hash presence, the doas escalation path on tiny-cloud images — come from Alpine's advisory. Other musl-based distributions or custom builds may be affected but lack equivalent public vendor confirmation, so absence from this article is not evidence of safety. Similarly, the exact behavior of non-Alpine PAM-disabled musl builds has not been independently documented here.

EPSS moves daily and its 0.189 reading can rise or fall; KEV listing for exploitation was added quickly but known-ransomware use remains Unknown. Whether mass scanning or exploitation of this exact bypass is occurring broadly is not established by current evidence — only that CISA deems the risk real enough to mandate remediation and that public reproductions exist. The CoeLab Real-World Impact score's exploitation component (30/30 from KEV) therefore reflects the directive, not observed campaign telemetry.

What could change the picture: further distribution-level advisories expanding the affected set, EPSS movement, addition of a ransomware-use classification, or — in the other direction — evidence that the practical attack surface is smaller than the environmental prerequisites suggest. Any of these would warrant a follow-up.

Sources and evidence date

Primary sources verified on 2026-11-17: the OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes (release dated 2026-11-05, describing the critical security workaround for Linux systems using musl libc with PAM disabled); the Alpine Linux security advisory of 2026-11-05 (attack prerequisites, affected releases 3.16–3.24 and edge, fixed package versions per branch, tiny-cloud image details, mitigation procedure); and the CVE record and CISA KEV feed data as collected at 2026-11-17 10:10 UTC (CVE record published 2026-11-05, updated 2026-11-10; KEV dateAdded 2026-11-09 with a 2026-11-12 due date; EPSS from FIRST dated 2026-11-16).

Timeline: the exploitable condition existed prior to disclosure; the vendor fix (OpenSSH 10.6p2) and Alpine advisory both landed 2026-11-05; the CVE record was published the same day and updated 2026-11-10; CISA KEV addition followed 2026-11-09. This article reflects evidence as of 2026-11-17 and covers the vendor-published state, not any private testing.

Primary-source links

https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html#10.6p2

https://alpinelinux.org/posts/2026-11-05-openssh-password-authentication-bypass/

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-123158

AI-assisted research and drafting, with a separate model editorial review. CoeLab ratings are editorial judgments, not a substitute for checking your own versions and vendor advisories. Methodology: https://thecoelab.com/blog/security/methodology

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